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ABSTRACT
Emerging markets do not handle adverse shocks well. In this paper, I will outline an explanation of
why emerging markets are so fragile, and why they may adopt contractual mechanisms  ￿ such as
a dollarized banking system -- that increase their fragility. I draw on this analysis to explain why
dollarized economies may be prone to dollar shortages and twin crises. The model of crises described
here differs in some important aspects from what is now termed the first, second, and third
generation models of crises. I then examine how domestic policies, especially monetary policy, can
mitigate the adverse effects of these crises. Finally, I will ask if there is a constructive role for
international financial institutions both in helping to prevent the crises and in helping resolve them.
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  There is a strong correlation between the stoppage of capital flows to a country, the 
extent of dollarization of the country’s banking system, and the prevalence of banking crises. 
Between 1974 and 2003, while 56 percent of all episodes where capital flows underwent a 
“sudden stop” were associated with a banking crisis, 75 percent of those episodes where the 
country also had a high level of dollarization ended in a banking crisis, and 100 percent of 
episodes where the country also had a high level of dollarization and a fixed exchange rate ended 
in a crisis (see IADB (2004)). What accounts for these correlations? Are there domestic policies 
that can mitigate these risks? Can international financial institutions be useful here? These are the 
questions addressed in this paper. 
  I start first with why emerging markets may adopt contractual mechanisms – such as a 
dollarized banking system -- that accentuate vulnerabilities. I will argue that emerging markets 
have weak institutions that tend to make it particularly hard to cope with economic adversity. As 
a result, instead of sharing the burden of downturns in predictable ways, it is spread in 
unpredictable ways, for example, through selective defaults and high inflation. The best 
protection for investors against such risks in an environment with limited contract enforcement 
may well be a domestic deposit denominated in foreign currency (following the tradition in this 
literature, I will call the foreign currency “dollars”). 
Critical to the functioning of the dollarized system is that there be enough dollars at all 
times. I will argue that an incipient dollar shortage, which can arise from a variety of causes 
including excessive government borrowing, an external “liquidity” shock, or an overvalued 
exchange rate, can be magnified by a dollarized banking system, into a total collapse of the 
financial system, the exchange rate, and other asset prices. The model of crisis described here 
differs in some important aspects from what is now termed the first, second, and third generation 
models of crises.   
The links between the government and the banking system can come about simply 
because both dip into a common pool of dollars, and not necessarily because the banking system   2 
holds significant amounts of government debt or the contingent liabilities of the banking system 
are borne by the government (see Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebello (2001)). Similarly, the 
collapse in the exchange rate and the collapse in the banking system can occur close together, not 
just because the corporate or banking system’s liabilities explode in value as a result of 
depreciation (see Aghion, Bachetta, and Benerjee  (2001)) but also because the depreciation is a 
result of the banking system’s desperation for dollars. Also, while dollar shortages can cause 
banking system crises, the reverse is also possible. This is not to say any of the other channels are 
unimportant, but rather I intend to focus on one particular channel, the banking system’s need for 
dollar liquidity, which can tie many of these effects together.  
  Finally, I will explore various possible policy interventions to mitigate the effect of dollar 
shortages, including whether the international financial institutions have a role to play. If 
dollarization arises primarily from institutional infirmities rather than a distorted incentive to take 
on risk, it may be costly to legislate it away. Countries may have to learn to live with dollarization 
for a while. At the same time, if poor institutions rather than poor incentives are to blame, 
interventions to mitigate the effects of dollarization may not significantly enhance moral hazard.   
  The rest of the paper is as follows. I start in section I with the basic argument, buttressed 
with some evidence for the assumptions. I then examine various interventions domestic 
authorities could undertake, and end with a discussion of possible interventions by the IFIs.  
I. A Framework 
1.1. Why are emerging markets different?   
Start first with what makes emerging markets different from developed countries. A 
growing number of economists see the main difference to be the quality of institutions. Since the 
word “institutions” seems to be so widely used nowadays, it is probably useful to define what I 
mean. Broadly speaking, one could group institutions into whether they are basic or narrow.  By 
basic, I mean institutions such as whether there is security of property, whether contracts are 
enforced, and whether people have democratic voice.  By narrow, I mean more detailed features   3 
of the institutional environment such as whether the central bank is de-facto independent or 
whether there is a functioning bankruptcy code. With few exceptions, a country with weak basic 
institutions also finds it difficult to build effective narrow institutions. 
One important role played by basic institutions is to mediate the outcome of conflicts in 
times of adversity. Typically, most differences can be papered over in a growing economy. But a 
downturn seems to bring out latent conflicts. 
Why growth seems to be easier to share than adversity is an interesting question. If agents 
are prone to habit formation in consumption, an income loss is much harder to swallow, while it 
is not that important to fight for a gain. Similarly, individual aversion to losses in wealth is a well-
documented phenomenon in behavioral science, and to the extent that individuals have already 
capitalized future incomes into their wealth, they may indeed feel less strongly about 
unanticipated income gains than about unanticipated losses. Finally, growth opportunities may 
indeed be more sensitive to conflict than losses (if workers and management squabble, they drive 
away investors and lose the chance to start new projects, but the old plant remains regardless of 
the level of conflict), so when there are substantial growth opportunities on the horizon, parties 
have the incentive to mute conflict (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales (2000)). 
Regardless of why conflicts are greater in times of economic adversity, how a society 
deals with them depends on the kind of institutions of conflict management it has. In a 
comprehensive study of failed states, Collier et al. (2003) find that armed conflict is preceded by 
years of poor economic growth. Moreover, even after concluding a peace, the probability of these 
states lapsing anew into conflict is high. Not surprisingly, these states typically have weak 
institutions of  conflict management such as patchy enforcement of the law, limited adherence to 
democratic principles, and few meaningful checks and balances on the government. Similarly, 
Rodrik (1999) finds that countries that experienced the sharpest drops in growth after 1975 were 
those with divided societies and weak institutions of conflict management (as proxied for by   4 
indicators of the quality of government institutions, rule of law, democratic rights, and social 
safety nets).    
Acemogulu, Johnson, et al.(2003) find that countries with poor institutions have the 
highest volatility of growth as also higher levels of inflation. Satyanath and Subramanian (2004) 
show that over and above the effect of policies, the quality of political institutions affects the 
extent of nominal macroeconomic instability in a country.  
In short, societies with well functioning institutions allocate burden sharing in times of 
distress in predictable ways. For example, those who suffer the most adversity can fall back on an 
explicit social safety net – a minimum level of unemployment insurance. Debtors and creditors 
can appeal to bankruptcy proceedings to determine their relative shares. Given that there is an 
explicit and contingent institutional sharing mechanism that dictates the division of pain, there is 
no need to take to the streets, the backrooms, or to the money printing press to settle outcomes. 
By contrast, when institutions are weak and neither offer acceptable settlements nor 
protect existing shares, everyone has an incentive to jockey for a greater share of the pie. 
Outcomes will be mediated by relative bargaining power than by pre-existing contracts. 
Often, bargaining will break down. When a government does not have the institutional 
capacity to allocate the burdens of adversity among its citizenry, the temptation will be to spread 
it through the easiest means available, inflation. Hence nominal instability will accompany real 
instability in countries with weak institutions lending support to the view that while the proximate 
cause for inflation may be monetary expansion, inflation is always and everywhere a political 
phenomenon! 
1.2. Evidence for the link between inflation and poor growth. 
  I want to establish two facts here, which are a little different from the work cited so far. 
First, I want to test whether the inflation “tax” is higher in downturns, and second, whether this 
phenomenon is particularly acute for countries with poor institutions. To check this, I have data 
on the value of the inflation tax, which is measured as ￿CPI /(1+ ￿CPI) where ￿CPI is the change   5 
in the Consumer Price Index in the country over the year. This is computed every year from 1965 
to 2002 for 165 countries. In Table 1, I present summary statistics and cross-correlations for the 
inflation tax, the standard deviation of the inflation tax computed over the preceding five years, 
the growth rate in GDP, and the quality of institutions measured by four different indices: 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.  In Figure 1, I 
plot the real growth of a country’s GDP, averaged over 1980 to 1995 against average inflation tax 
over the same period, separately for countries with below median levels of government 
effectiveness and countries above median. The negative slope is steeper in the former, suggesting 
slower growth is correlated with more inflation in countries with weak institutions. 
Rather than average correlations, we are interested in the time series patterns across 
countries. In Table 2 we use a panel of observations where the dependent variable is the inflation 
tax in a year in a country. In column (1), I estimate a random effects GLS model where the 
explanatory variables is a constant and the growth rate in GDP.  The coefficient of the GDP 
growth rate is negative and highly significant suggesting periods of low GDP growth are when 
the inflation tax is highest. A standard deviation increase in the growth rate is associated with a 
reduction in the inflation tax by .0241, which is 20 percent of its sample standard deviation. In 
column (2), I include the index of government efficiency (the results with other institutional 
variables are qualitatively similar) and the interaction of GDP growth with the index. As the prior 
literature has found, countries with a better institutional environment tend to experience lower 
inflation tax. Particularly interesting is that the positive significant coefficient of the interaction 
term suggests, as predicted, that the inflation tax in countries with better institutions is less 
sensitive to growth. In column (3), we estimate the model including country fixed effects, and 
find no qualitative change in the coefficients of interest.    
One problem with the estimated model is that we cannot tell the direction of causality. 
High inflation may, in fact, cause low growth, though why this should be more pronounced in 
countries with poor institutions is harder to say. Nevertheless, it is important to examine the effect   6 
of the exogenous component of growth on the inflation tax. Typically, a country will be affected 
by similar exogenous shocks as its neighbors, if not directly, then via trade. So one plausible 
instrument for a country’s i’s growth is EXTGROWTH, which is the weighted average growth of 
all other countries j, with each country j’s growth weighted by that country’s log GDP and 
divided by the square of the distance between i and j. In column (4), we re-estimate the fixed 
effects model, using EXTGROWTH to instrument for growth. The coefficient of the interaction 
is now larger in magnitude and stronger in significance. 
One could ask if this effect is special to small countries.
2 In column 5, we re-estimate the 
fixed effect instrumented regression separately for countries that are below the sample median in 
real GDP in 1999 (GDP sample median=9.182 billion $US) and, in column 6, for countries that 
are above the median. While the magnitude of the interaction coefficient is about 50 percent 
larger for the smaller-countries sub-sample, it is estimated more precisely for the larger ones.  
Finally, while we have instrumented for growth, we have not instrumented for 
institutional quality, the other element of the interaction. There is some controversy about what 
instruments are appropriate for institutions. Following Acemogulu et al. (2002), we use the log of 
a country’s population density in 1500 (countries that had less of a native population were less 
likely to have an exploitative colonial structure imposed on them and have better institutions 
today) as an instrument for institutional quality in column (7). While we lose a number of 
countries, the coefficient of the interaction is still positive, large, and statistically significant.  
The bottom line is that the inflation tax is higher when countries experience poor growth, 
and it is particularly high when those countries have poor institutions.
3 Poor societies with weak 
institutions do not share the burden of distress well. 
                                                 
2 Large countries may affect the growth of their neighbors. So there is a case for arguing the instrument is 
purer for small countries. 
3 The fact that inflation is higher in bad times is not inconsistent with the finding in Kaminsky, Reinhart, 
and Vegh (2004) that policies in developing countries are pro-cyclical. While fiscal and monetary policies 
may indeed tighten in downturns, they may not tighten enough given the economy’s institutions to avert 
generalized inflation.   7 
1.3. Contractual Adaptation 
If the country’s underlying basic and narrow institutions do not permit a contingent, 
speedy, and predictable sharing of adverse economic circumstances, and the tendency of the 
government is to spread the burden along the path of least resistance, economic agents will take 
steps to protect themselves. But without a reliable and effective legal system, what can they do? 
Clearly the answer has to be to use instruments that depend in a very limited way on the legal 
system for enforcement. 
One approach is to use inflexible, non-contingent contracts, whose violation is easily 
detected. For example, labor contracts in many developing countries effectively do not permit 
employees to be fired. This is seen as inefficient because it does not allow firms to react quickly 
to business conditions. Often, these prohibitions are ascribed to overly strong unions that hold the 
economy to ransom. But if courts are slow and corrupt, so that a worker who is wrongfully fired 
has no redress, perhaps the prohibition of firing—because violations are so easily and publicly 
observable and can be responded to through mass protests—is the only way to protect workers 
from arbitrary decisions by employers (also see Glaeser and Shleifer (2001)). Job tenure may also 
act as a form of social security because the government does a miserable job providing a safety 
net, and private insurance markets do not exist. Thus an inflexible contract can protect workers 
when the preponderance of bargaining power is with firms. 
This is not to argue against reforming these contracts – they may outlive their initial 
usefulness as the legal system is reformed, and continue to be supported by vested interests. The 
arguments I have made may be trotted out as a defense long after they are valid.  
1.3.1. Demandable debt 
Interestingly, an extremely flexible financial contract may also be a form of protection. 
Consider a bank demand deposit. Essentially, a demand deposit has two features that make it 
virtually self-enforcing. First, the bank is required to honor the claim when it is presented at the 
teller window. If it is slow in doing so, or attempts in any way to renege, the news spreads   8 
quickly since the refusal to honor a demand deposit is such a clear and incontrovertible event. 
Second, the bank honors withdrawals in the order they are presented until no more depositors 
want to withdraw or the bank fails. “Sequential service” implies that when depositors sense even 
the slightest hint of potential distress, they have a strong incentive to withdraw their money – if 
they do, at worst they have the trouble of re-depositing if the bank later turns out to be safe, if 
they don’t, they may end up penniless as the bank fails.  
The two features ensure that the ordinary depositor has a fairly secure claim, supported 
by other depositors – the threat of a bank run plays the same role as the threat of a labor strike – if 
bank management reneges on the commitment to repay the deposit contract it will face a 
depositor run which will close it down. So except in the case where it absolutely cannot pay, bank 
management will honor deposit contracts. This may be one reason why banks are such an 
important  component of the financial sector in emerging markets (see Calomiris and Kahn 
(1991), Diamond and Rajan (2001)). 
The point is that anticipating little power over outcomes in downturns, weaker agents 
might demand contractual options that will help alter the status quo going in to those downturns. 
For labor, it is the option to keep a job, for depositors, it is the option to get their money. For the 
economy as a whole, however, the exercise of these options add to the difficulty of adjustment in 
downturns, exacerbating the problems created by institutional weakness. 
In the rest of the paper, I will examine these problems further, specifically focusing on 
how demandable debt raises the risks of financing industry in emerging markets. But before I 
explore that, let me add two more ingredients. 
1.3.2 Domestic Liability Dollarization 
 Because inflation is likely to explode in downturns – because inflation is a greater 
systematic risk in the financial sense in emerging markets – depositors will demand an 
extraordinarily high premium for holding inflation risk. This means that issuers who want to 
minimize expected debt service (perhaps because of short horizons or because they are liquidity   9 
constrained) will opt to issue real instruments (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) for a 
related explanation and Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) and Jeanne (2002) on other theories why 
inflation risk could lead to dollarization). 
If there is high volatility in inflation (which usually accompanies a high inflation rate) in 
addition to weak institutions, inflation indexed instruments may not be attractive to the public. 
Uncertainty about the measurement of inflation, delays in producing an accurate estimate, and 
fears that measurement will be manipulated, can increase their risks. The natural way to issue real 
bonds is to denominate them in a foreign currency  rather than to issue inflation indexed bonds. 
Thus suspicion about the official actions in a downturn lead quite naturally to domestic liability 
dollarization –  approximately 40-45 percent of bank deposits in Europe, Latin America, and the 
Middle East are denominated in foreign currencies (see Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2003)). 
1.3.3  Evidence on Liability Dollarization   
What evidence do we have for this conjecture? Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2003) find that 
in a cross-section of countries, the extent of dollarization (dollar deposits to total deposits) is 
positively and significantly correlated with the log of inflation. However, when a proxy for 
institutional quality is included, inflation no longer enters significantly. The evidence is consistent 
with weak institutions driving inflation, which in turn leads to greater dollarization. 
Again, however, we want to test a more nuanced version. We also want to see if there is a 
relationship between the sensitivity of inflation tax to growth (which we have seen, appears to 
reflect the ability of a country to cope allocate the costs of economic adversity) and the level of 
dollarization. We also want to see if the extent of dollarization is related to the volatility of 
inflation, over and above its correlation with the level of inflation. In Table 3, I present summary 
statistics and cross correlations. The extent of liability dollarization is measured by the ratio of 
foreign currency deposits to total deposits (FCDTD) in a country’s banking system averaged over 
the 1990s, using the Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2003) data. The sensitivity of inflation tax to 
growth for a country (henceforth “SENSITIVITY”) is the coefficient estimate on GDP growth in   10 
a regression of the inflation tax on GDP growth for that country for the period 1965-2002. The 
standard deviation of inflation tax is measured for every period t by its standard deviation during 
the five years from t-4 to t; then for the cross section we take the average of standard deviation 
over 1965 to 2002.  
In Table 4, the dependent variable is liability dollarization in a country in the 1990s. In 
column (1) I include the sensitivity of inflation to GDP growth and a constant as explanatory 
variables. The coefficient estimate for the sensitivity is negative and significant. Since the 
sensitivity is typically negative (lower growth, more inflation tax), countries with a higher 
magnitude of the sensitivity have greater deposit dollarization as expected. In Figure 2, I plot the 
extent of dollarization against SENSITIVITY.  As the graph suggests, the relationship is likely to 
be non-linear. So in column (2), I allow for a non-linear specification of sensitivity by including 
the square of sensitivity. The coefficient of the squared term is positive and strongly significant. 
Greater sensitivity again is correlated with greater dollarization. If sensitivity changes from 0 to 
its lower 1 percentile threshold (-0.029), dollarization increases by 33 percent, which is 140 
percent of its standard deviation. 
I check that this relationship persists even when we include the “usual suspects”. In 
column (3), I include the average inflation tax in the country, and in column (4) I add the standard 
deviation of the inflation tax. While the coefficients for the non-linear specification for sensitivity 
are positive and statistically significant in both columns, the coefficient for inflation tax is 
positive and significant only when included alone, but becomes insignificant when the standard 
deviation of inflation tax is included. The estimates for sensitivity are qualitatively similar if we 
include squared terms for inflation tax and the standard deviation of inflation tax (estimates not 
reported). Finally, in column (5), we include both the log of per capita GDP and the index of legal 
restrictions on dollarization compiled by Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2003), which is available for 
only 83 of the countries, and find qualitatively similar results.    11 
One should not read too much into these last few “kitchen sink” regressions since 
sensitivity, inflation tax, and the standard deviation of the inflation tax measure various aspects of 
the same thing. All I want to show the reader is that both sensitivity and the standard deviation of 
inflation tax seem to be correlated with the extent of dollarization as predicted by the earlier 
discussion, and seem to capture something more than just the level of the inflation tax, which the 
prior literature has identified.  
The evidence thus far is consistent with the following conclusions: Countries with weak 
institutions have greater sensitivity of inflation to growth. In countries with higher sensitivity, 
investors have a higher demand for real deposits. Because inflation is also very volatile, they may 
prefer deposits denominated in foreign exchange rather than deposits that are indexed.
4  
1.4. Aggregate Dollar Constraints/Sudden stops 
Let us now add the final ingredient to the “model”. Since emerging markets with the 
weakest institutions for conflict management (and the most divided societies) have the hardest 
time spreading the burdens of distress, they are also likely to have the most difficulty raising 
resources to continue to service external debt. The tendency of some countries to default 
repeatedly (Reinhart, Rogoff, Savastano (2003)) may reflect the weakness of their capacity to 
manage economic adversity than any inherent lack of honesty on the part of their governments. 
But this means that these countries are likely to face aggregate constraints on external borrowing 
sooner than other countries. Since in periods of adversity, creditors will reduce their expectations 
of what the country will be able to repay, they will also reduce what they are willing to lend. Such 
a “vertical” constraint on dollars the country can borrow (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
(2000,2001)) or sudden stop (Calvo and Reinhart (2000)), will interact with liability dollarization 
to produce unfortunate consequences we now document. 
                                                 
4 There is a sense in which this argument runs counter to the “Original Sin” thesis  (for example, see 
Hausman, Eichengreen, and Panizza (2002)) because I attribute financial fragilities to weak institutions 
rather than to other factors like country size. But Hausman et al. (2002) focus on the currency denomination 
of public debt rather than on the currency denomination of bank debt. For another view of institutional 
explanations of financial system fragilities, see Mody (2004).    12 
II. Consequences: Overshooting, Liquidation, and Contagion 
Now that we have the ingredients, dollarized bank deposits and the possibility of 
aggregate constraints on borrowing, let us sketch the consequences.  
2.1. The Sources of Dollar Shortage 
In the normal course, dollar depositors will want to withdraw some of their deposits. The 
reasons for this can range from normal liquidity needs (such as importing foreign goods) to good 
dollar investment opportunities outside the country. Clearly, if their bank has fewer dollar 
reserves than the amount of withdrawals, it will buy dollars on the market. Summing across 
banks, there will be an aggregate demand for dollars, which will have to be met out of the 
country’s reserves, dollar repatriation by exporters, and, if necessary, additional external 
borrowing. It does not really matter which domestic entity (government or banks) does the 
external borrowing since the aggregate available pool of dollar resources will determine whether 
the aggregate domestic demand can be satisfied.  
Problems arise when the aggregate demand exceeds the aggregate supply (not including 
borrowing) and the country has difficulty borrowing the shortfall. One such situation is one where 
the economy is booming but the (fixed) exchange rate is overvalued. Exporters may not earn 
enough and, far from bringing foreign exchange into the country to repay loans, may seek to draw 
down their deposits to continue operations. Importers may have a huge demand for dollars 
because foreign goods appear cheap. When added to the normal liquidity needs of depositors, the 
demand may be so high that it even exceeds the willingness of foreign investors to lend the 
shortfall. Another situation is when the excess demand is relatively small but the economy is in a 
bad way or the government has over-borrowed, so foreign investors are unwilling even to lend 
meager amounts of extra dollars needed. In fact, the government can contribute to the private 
sector dollar shortage by adding its own external financing needs.  
Regardless of how the dollar shortage emerges (and we will shortly see some examples), 
the dollarized banking system can exacerbate it (see Diamond and Rajan (forthcoming) for a   13 
detailed model). Since the banks have issued a non-renegotiable promise to pay dollars, they 
either have to convince their own depositors not to withdraw by hiking the interest rates paid on 
dollar deposits or they have to attract dollars away from other banks in the spot market. Higher 
rates may quell some depositor demand, but it will leave a core liquidity demand that cannot be 
deterred with higher rates. If this still exceeds the available dollars, the banks will compete with 
each other for scarce dollars. Given that a bank fails if it does not come up with the needed 
dollars, it will be willing to pay what it takes for additional dollars. But there is an overall 
shortage so banks can competitively drive each other into failure. 
Short banks will sell non-dollar spot assets and long term assets for dollars. Thus the 
exchange rate (dollars per domestic currency) will tend to fall and interest rates (both for long 
term dollar assets and for long term domestic currency assets) will rise. In principle, because the 
quantity of dollar demand and supply cannot adjust readily, these prices can move very far from 
any notion of fundamental value. Both the exchange rate and the interest rate can overshoot 
during the scramble for dollar liquidity. 
Real decisions will be affected during this scramble, with lasting consequences. Let us go 
systematically through them. 
2.2. Real Consequences 
The first place banks will look for additional dollars is amongst those who generate them 
and those who use them. Exporters will be squeezed, in an attempt to get them to speed up their 
own dollar receipts and hasten repayment of dollar borrowings to banks (on average, across 
emerging markets approximately 30 percent of domestic loans made by banks are denominated in 
foreign currency (see IMF (2004)). To raise these amounts quickly, exporters will sell finished 
goods inventories at steep discounts, and reduce near-term sales prices. They will shelve exports 
that are highly import intensive, and abandon longer term projects, especially those that require 
capital goods imports.    14 
Clearly, all these actions will impair the economy’s medium run ability to export and thus 
its ability to generate dollars in the future. The weaker a country’s institutions, the greater will be 
the discount banks place on a future dollar generated by an exporter relative to a current dollar 
(foreign investors will be willing to lend less against the future), and the greater the long-run 
destructive consequences of a scramble for dollars. 
Not only will these effects be seen in the tradeable sector, but also in the non-tradeable 
sector. As domestic interest rates rise (because long run domestic assets are being sold for 
dollars), more and more domestic projects will have to meet an impossible hurdle rate and be 
shelved.  
As bank assets fall in value, some banks, typically the one with the greatest asset liability 
currency mismatch (though see later), will become insolvent. This will trigger a generalized run 
on the banks’ assets, causing even those who had no desire to withdraw to add to dollar demand.
5 
The horizon of failing banks will be even shorter, causing them to be even more indiscriminate in 
the squeeze they put on borrowers. Even projects that could produce substantial dollar revenues 
in the near term may be sacrificed for the immediate need – for example, banks may stop offering 
working capital loans and export credit even if these are essential for the exporter to generate 
revenues. As a result, the aggregate pool of dollars available over the near term could fall as 
banks fail, and the aggregate excess demand for dollars could increase, putting pressure on other 
banks.
6 This form of contagion  could imperil the entire banking system. 
To summarize: When bank depositors demand repayment in dollars but the economy 
cannot generate enough dollars to repay them, the consequences can be very serious. Domestic 
dollar interest rates will rise to draw in dollars and choke off depositor demands. But if there is a 
                                                 
5 Note that if the exchange rate is fixed but there are no capital controls, domestic currency depositors have 
an even greater incentive to withdraw (and convert) than dollar depositors because they will fear a 
devaluation. 
6 Clearly a bank that fails will refuse to honor some of its dollar depositors. The unsatisfied demand of 
these depositors will reduce aggregate demand. Therefore the effect of bank failure on the excess demand 
for dollars depends on whether supply falls faster than demand. See Diamond and Rajan (forthcoming) for 
conditions under which this is true.   15 
core group of depositors who absolutely want to withdraw dollars, and a limit to which outsiders 
are willing to lend to the country, the country’s banking system can be faced with an excess 
demand for dollars that cannot be met. If so, other asset prices will fall precipitously as banks 
scramble to capture enough dollars from the common pool to save themselves.  Domestic 
currency interest rates will spike up, while the exchange rate will plummet. Banks will squeeze 
borrowers, and aggregate activity will fall. Some banks may become insolvent and such failures 
could be contagious. Of course, in any such model, we could get multiple equilibria, where 
outside lenders impose a sudden stop, which leads to the dollar shortage, which leads to bank 
actions that reduce future dollar receipts, which justify the stop. But we do not need to appeal to 
multiple equilibria to explain crisis – a spike upwards in dollar demand or downwards in dollar 
supply, coupled with a “normal” demand for liquidity are sufficient to produce the effects. 
Consider now how this “model” differs from earlier work. In a comprehensive survey, 
Frankel and Wei (2004) attempt to distinguish between the three “generations” of crisis models 
on the basis on their explanation of why the crisis occurs:  
“ Whose fault is the crisis?  Generation I  says domestic macroeconomic policy, Generation II 
says volatile financial markets, and Generation III  says financial structure.  In neutral language, 
the explanations are, respectively, excessive macroeconomic expansion, “multiple equilibria,” 
and moral hazard.   In finger-pointing language, the respective culprits are undisciplined domestic 
policymakers, crazy international investors, and crony capitalists.” 
 
The “model” in this paper is related to the third generation models in that it focuses on structural 
problems associated with lending to emerging markets. But crises are not necessarily caused by 
willful misbehavior. Instead, they stem from adverse liquidity shocks that jolt a system that is 
necessarily rigid, given the institutional inadequacies of the economy. Put another way, better 
regulation and supervision may not necessarily eliminate the possibility of a crisis. What is really 
needed is deep rooted institutional reform: susceptibility to crises in my framework ultimately lie 
not in an incentive problem but a collective action problem. 
2.3. Related Literature   16 
  The paper that is most closely related to this one is Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004), 
who also focus on a link between sudden stops, dollarization, and banking crises. In their paper, 
sudden stops lead to a devaluation – in order to maintain external balance  -- which then causes 
problems in the dollarized banking system as a result of liability mismatches. In other words, 
macro-causes have micro-consequences. In my model, the channel is not the need to maintain 
external balance but bank liquidity. The sudden stop creates a dollar shortage, which leads banks 
to dump assets, causing the exchange rate (and interest rates) to overshoot fundamentals, which 
then creates balance sheet problems for the banking system. Micro-causes aggregate up to have 
macro-consequences.  
While I think both explanations have merit, there are differences. For instance, to the 
extent that a devaluation gives exporters the ability to earn more (expansionary devaluation), 
there is no reason for it to hurt a dollarized banking system – since banks typically make dollar 
loans (see Nicola et al. (2003)). But to the extent that the capacity to earn dollars does not 
translate into current dollars, there is a liquidity mismatch, and banks could still go under in my 
framework. 
2.3. Some Examples 
Consider some examples. 
Argentina (2001)
7 
By end 2000, the Argentinian banking system had approximately $72 billion in foreign 
currency denominated assets and approximately the same amount in liabilities. By most 
standards, it seemed to have matched exposures. But $25 billion of its assets were government 
securities, issued by a government that was increasingly strapped for financing. Another $41 
billion were foreign currency denominated loans and securities issued by Argentinian 
corporations, who clearly did not have the ability to repay quickly given that exports amounted to 
only $ 31 billion. And of the liabilities, $ 48.5 billion were foreign currency deposits. 
                                                 
7 This section relies heavily on IMF (2004)   17 
In this fragile situation depositor runs could start for two related reasons. If the 
government could not draw in more external resources to meet its own external debt service 
needs or its new borrowing requirements, it would severely constrain the anticipated available 
dollar pool. The banking system’s liquidity needs would compete with the government’s needs, 
pushing up interest rates and perhaps lead to a devaluation.
8 A second rationale could be that, 
given the extensive bank holdings of government assets, a government default could render banks 
insolvent (though see below). 
Depositor runs started in 2001. Bank liabilities fell by $24 billion (approximately 9 
percent of GDP). In fact, Argentina lost more dollars as a result of the bank run than as a result of 
the inability of the government to access external markets to meet financing needs. Interestingly, 
the fall in domestic currency denominated deposits was far greater than the fall in foreign 
currency deposits, suggesting depositors feared a devaluation, perhaps resulting from the liquidity 
shortage, more than a bank default. Since bank holdings of government debt could not be reduced 
(in fact, they increased), the run was financed by curtailing private lending ($ 12 billion), running 
down bank liquid assets ($ 5 billion) and borrowing from the central bank ($ 9 billion).   
Ultimately, the entire banking system was affected, deposits were frozen then loans and 
deposits were “pesified” at different rates. The consequences are still being dealt with. The point 
to take away is that a government may affect the dollarized domestic banking system simply by 
crowding out access to dollars .  
Uruguay (2002) 
Uruguay had almost the reverse set of events – liquidity problems in the banking sector 
caused a crisis, a devaluation, and problems for the government, which had to restructure debt. 
Let us examine how this happened. 
                                                 
8 Though not necessarily a default by dollar borrowers. For instance, Bleakley and Cowan (2002) find that 
the negative balance sheet effects of devaluation are outweighed by the competitiveness gains for a sample 
of Latin American firms.   18 
Uruguay also has a highly dollarized banking system – bank deposits were about 90 
percent of GDP in end 2001, and 90 percent of these deposits were dollar denominated. About 
half these deposits were held by non-residents, typically Argentineans. 
As the Argentineans saw their Argentinean deposits frozen, they started withdrawing 
from Uruguayan banks. This was a pure liquidity need, which could have been met by Uruguay’s 
domestic holdings of liquid foreign currency assets. However, anticipating a shortage, Uruguayan 
residents also began withdrawing deposits. The currency depreciated precipitously as over 45 
percent of the foreign currency deposits were withdrawn in 2002, prompting further concerns 
about bank solvency. The government declared a bank holiday to stop the run, and was eventually 
successful in reopening the banking system with the help of a Stand By Arrangement from the 
IMF and rescheduling deposits in the banking system.  
As a result of the depreciation, public debt, which was largely foreign currency 
denominated, ballooned from about 45 percent of GDP by end 2001 to 100 percent of GDP by 
end 2002, so eventually it had to be restructured. Thus liquidity problems in the banking sector 
led to problems for the government in servicing public debt. Let us now turn to Korea. 
South Korea (1997-98) 
It is generally accepted that the proximate reason for the Asian financial crisis was a 
decline in export growth, especially in key areas like semi-conductors, caused by weakening 
demand in importing partners, and an appreciation in the real exchange rate as the dollar (to 
which many Asian currencies were implicitly pegged) strengthened against the yen. While this 
was the trigger in Korea, it was compounded by a banking system that had issued a significant 
amount of short term external debt and thus was susceptible to the liquidity shock stemming from 
the real external sector. Contrast this with the liquidity shock in the case of Argentina, which was 
a result of the government losing access to external borrowing, while in the case of Uruguay, it 
was withdrawals by Argentinean depositors who had lost access to their domestic deposits.    19 
I will not describe the details of the crisis, which resembled in many ways what I have 
described above (see IMF (2002, 210) and IMF (1999, 188) for details). Korean banks initially 
started facing difficulties in mid 1997. The government announced a guarantee of foreign 
borrowings by Korean banks  and the central bank attempted to help foreign branches and 
subsidiaries of Korean banks roll over their foreign currency borrowings. But this depleted 
reserves, leaving the central bank with little to fight domestic bank runs. Even though the 
guarantee had been announced, the government simply did not have the necessary dollars. The 
won fell sharply. 
In early December, the IMF announced a Stand-By Arrangement with Korea equivalent 
to $ 21 billion, with additional financing from others of $ 37 billion. Yet this massive package 
was not enough, and the won continued dropping. It was only when foreign private banks agreed 
to maintain their exposure to Korean banks by exchanging their inter-bank loans for short term 
government guaranteed bonds, and when the IMF accelerated disbursement of the loan, that 
pressure on the won abated. In terms of our framework, the shortage was eliminated by reducing 
dollar demand and increasing dollar supply and thus alleviating pressure on both the exchange 
rate and the interest rate. 
Interestingly, in the case of Korea, a liquidity crisis was averted because the government 
had spare borrowing capacity and could draw in dollars (with some help from the IFIs and 
developed country governments), which it then lent out to the banks. This leads us more generally 
to the question of interventions. 
III. Interventions 
Let us recapitulate what happens if no intervention takes place. Obviously, the only way 
to eliminate a dollar shortage is to increase supply or reduce demand. If dollar depositors who 
seek to withdraw are not tempted to stay in the bank by higher dollar interest rates (for the same 
reason, perhaps, that higher interest rates do not draw fresh foreign investors in),  then banks will 
start competing for scarce dollars. Since a bank has to satisfy every one of its withdrawing dollar   20 
depositors in order to stay in business, it will be willing to pay any feasible price if it is falling 
short. This is why prices can deviate so far from fundamentals – the bank essentially faces a 
classic short squeeze where it has to deliver a specific asset in short supply, so it is willing to sell 
all other assets, almost regardless of price. 
Dollar-short banks will sell both long term liquid domestic assets as well as short term 
domestic assets to raise dollars (assuming they have already run down long term foreign assets, 
which would have a liquid external market). The exchange rate will fall while domestic market 
interest rates will rise.  
Ultimately, however, given that dollars cannot be manufactured domestically, some 
banks will have to fail. That could ease the shortage if the banks that fail are the most illiquid, and 
can clearly be isolated from the rest. But these banks will fail only after asset prices have, in 
general, become quite depressed. Surviving banks will also experience the depressed prices and 
thus have only a thin margin of capitalization. It is quite possible that they could also be run. Of 
course, if bank failures or closures do not ease the dollar shortage, the shortage itself could spread 
contagion, as we have seen. Thus doing nothing has potential costs, one of which is a possible 
meltdown of the system. 
3.1. Ex Post Intervention by Country Authorities 
3. 1.1. Dollar (foreign liquidity) infusions 
Clearly, the ideal intervention in the face of a dollar shortage would be to supply dollars 
or convince dollar demanders to voluntarily hold off pressing their claims. If the government has 
plenty of reserves, spare borrowing capacity, or support amongst international financial 
institutions, these dollars could be sold into the banking system thus alleviating pressure. 
Similarly, if the government can use moral suasion (or local currency guarantees) to persuade 
potential withdrawers to stay in, it reduces the dollar shortage. However, we have defined a 
liquidity shortage as one when the government itself has too few resources (or moral suasion) to 
contribute. So let us turn to other interventions.   21 
3.1.2. Recapitalization 
The authorities can recapitalize specific banks by offering them additional domestic 
assets or guarantees (backed by domestic assets). Often, what is termed “liquidity support” are 
simply loans by the central bank to distressed banks without adequate collateral backing the loans 
– in short, they are partial recapitalizations.  
While targeted recapitalizations can prevent specific banks from failing, there is an 
aggregate dollar gap that has to be closed somehow. Unless other banks are allowed to fail, the 
aggregate dollar demand cannot be satisfied. This implies that a bank recapitalization without any 
attempt to bridge the dollar gap only forces other, potentially healthier, banks to fail. A blanket 
recapitalization or guarantee of all banks simply allows all banks to bid more for dollars (that is, it 
increases the interest or exchange overshooting) without reducing the eventual extent of bank 
failures. This is why it is best to close down some banks and thus resolve the dollar shortage 
before offering indiscriminate guarantees.  
Recapitalizations do increase the value that is paid for scarce dollars. If there is an under-
incentive to hold dollar reserves up front (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001)), then the 
anticipation of recapitalizations can improve incentives to hold dollars.  
3.1.3. Monetary Policy 
The monetary authorities could be accommodative and buy long term domestic assets 
in exchange for domestic reserves (or do the opposite). Monetary accommodation will reduce the 
extent to which the burden of adjustment falls on the interest rate, and increase the downward 
pressure on the exchange rate.  If not reversed later, it will increase inflationary pressures. 
However, the proximate effect will be to shift the burden amongst banks – the survival 
chances of banks with relatively more holdings of long term domestic assets will improve, while 
the chances of those with more dollar liabilities will weaken. Whether the new pattern of failure 
improves the overall dollar shortage depends on whether the newly failing banks subtract more 
dollar liquidity in failing than the banks that would fail absent the intervention.     22 
The choice between an interest rate defense (keeping the interest rate high) and an 
exchange rate defense (keeping the exchange rate low) in this simple framework amounts to 
which defense will allow the banking system to come through the dollar shortage with the 
minimum long term damage. The choice between the two defenses is really a choice between 
selecting two different sets of banks for failure. The longer term effects of the chosen defense on 
the exchange rate and the interest rate will depend on the damage the choice does to the real 
economy – through the extent of bank failure and the damage the failing banks’ clients sustain-- 
and not per se on the defense that is picked. I am, of course, abstracting from any issues of 
credibility here, though it would be hard to unambiguously relate monetary authority credibility 
gains to a particular form of defense.  
Before proceeding to other interventions, we should note that the monetary authority also 
has the ability to select banks that will fail by allocating its limited foreign exchange reserves 
only to some banks (i.e., at a subsidized price) and not to others. While such an intervention is 
fraught with political difficulties (who will be chosen and will the process be transparent), it 
ultimately is an optimization problem where regulators allocate scarce resources to minimize the 
overall cost of bank failures.  Thus it is not dissimilar in consequence to other interventions. 
3.1.4. Forced conversion/suspension of convertibility/capital controls.  
Finally, consider even stronger interventions which violate the rights of the depositors. 
These include forced conversion into domestic currency at a pre-determined (typically below 
market) rate, the freezing of foreign currency deposits, and the imposition of capital controls. 
Clearly, these interventions can be implemented only by the country authorities and not by the 
banks alone. 
While these interventions do solve, to differing extents, the problem of dollar shortage, 
they do so at the expense of a substantial loss in future credibility. Moreover, it is not clear that 
they can be implemented effectively and for the long term. For instance, capital controls tend to 
leak, and the longer they are in place, the more they leak. So the authorities had better be   23 
confident that the liquidity shortage is temporary, else the breathing space these measures gives 
them will not be enough to rectify the problem, and the problem will return with a vengeance 
with the added difficulty that the authorities then have no credibility. 
3.2. Ex ante intervention by country authorities. 
Thus far we have discussed measures that could be taken in the face of a crisis. Consider 
now measures that could be taken by an economy attempting to bullet-proof itself against a crisis. 
3.2.1. Reserves 
One way to bullet-proof an economy is for the authorities to build foreign reserves. Of 
course, there are costs to holding reserves and to building them, including the fiscal costs and 
possible distortions in the exchange rate. Furthermore, it is possible that the level of dollarization 
in the economy increases as reserves, and confidence, grow. As a result, the authorities may lose 
all control over monetary policy and the transmission mechanism. Building a moderate amount of 
reserves is clearly warranted, but the welfare effects of building a hoard large enough to buffer 
most crises are ambiguous. 
A second question that arises with reserves is whether the country should use them to 
prepay debt. In other words, is spare debt capacity not the same as holding reserves, and less 
costly to boot? For the riskiest countries though, prepaying debt may be dominated by holding 
reserves: spare debt capacity is less fungible than reserves, and may also disappear in a crisis. 
Also, by prepaying debt, the country loses the option to force a restructuring, which may be 
valuable in times of stress.  
3.2.2. De-dollarization and shifting dollarization 
Given the risks associated with dollar shortages, some countries, including Mexico and 
Bolivia in 1982 and Peru in 1985, have opted to ban dollarization. But if the proximate cause, 
monetary instability, is not eliminated, investors will demand significantly higher interest rates to 
hold domestic currency deposits, and some may simply take the money out of the country.   24 
Consistent with this, countries that today have significant restrictions on dollarization, such as 
Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, have particularly high loan spreads (see IADB (2004)).  
Also, domestic currency depositors are not passive. With less-than-effective monetary 
authorities, banks could be subject to stress even if they only issue domestic deposits. For 
instance, suppose the authorities maintain an overvalued but fixed exchange rate. Fearing an 
eventual return to equilibrium, depositors have an incentive to withdraw and convert into foreign 
currency. This puts enormous stress on the banking system, forcing it to pay high interest rates to 
keep depositors in, with the level of interest rates being determined by the degree of 
overvaluation rather than more typical determinants like the return on investment and expected 
inflation. As described earlier, domestic currency depositors were prominent in the Argentinean 
bank runs in 2001. 
The point is that dollarization is not necessarily an aberration in the environment which 
gives birth to it. Instead, it may be a reasonable adaptation. As Savastano (1996) and Balino et al. 
(1999) document, the consequence of banning dollarization in Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru was 
typically a severe contraction of intermediation which was reversed in Bolivia and Peru only 
when dollar deposits were allowed again. Similarly, Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2003) show that 
economies with high inflation tend to have more monetary depth with dollarization than without.  
Rather than banning liability dollarization, authorities may want to focus on removing 
distortions that lead it to be used in excess, such as the issuers not internalizing all the risks. More 
useful, of course, is to focus on changing the underlying conditions that lead to dollarization, a 
point I will touch on shortly.  
Before concluding this section, note two pints. First, the transition from an economy with 
liability dollarization to one where dollarization is banned implies either violating existing dollar 
contracts and prohibiting new ones, or shifting dollar liabilities to another domestic entity. The 
Brazilian government essentially took the latter route by taking on the dollar liabilities of its 
banking system – through the issuance of dollar denominated bonds to banks in 1998. As a result,   25 
even though the real depreciated substantially in 1998-99, the banks were relatively immunized. 
Of course, government debt ballooned as a result. 
From a theoretical perspective, it can be welfare-improving for the government to take on 
the dollar liabilities of the banking sector. When individual banks fail during a dollar shortage, we 
have seen they can worsen the aggregate shortage. When the government takes over the liabilities 
of the banking sector, these failures are eliminated, so the dollar shortage need not be as severe. 
Against this, one should weigh the increased moral hazard if the government is expected to step 
in every time banks anticipate trouble. 
Second, as argued above, with a fixed exchange rate and full convertibility, even 
domestic currency denominated liabilities may become a source vulnerability. This suggests that 
the choice of exchange regime is not without consequence (also see, for example, Burnside, 
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001b) or Edwards (2004)). But unfortunately, the very institutional 
requirements needed to maintain a monetary anchor with a floating exchange rate regime may be 
missing in countries where fixed exchange regimes create vulnerabilities. Therefore, there are 
trade-offs involved in the choice of exchange regime, and as suggested by Calvo and Mishkin 
(2003), it may be more useful to focus on changing the underlying institutions rather than on 
choosing a specific regime. 
3.2.4. Institutional reform 
The root cause of deposit dollarization, we have argued, is weak basic institutions for 
conflict management. The more proximate causes are inadequate fiscal and monetary institutions. 
Of course it easier (though not easy) to reform these narrow institutions than reforming basic 
institutions. But without reforming the deeper basic institutions, which typically requires deep-
rooted political change, how successful can reform of narrow institutions be? We do not know 
much about the process of institutional reform other than some countries like Chile, Mexico, and 
South Korea have improved their basic institutions over a relatively short time, aided by good 
policies and rapid economic growth. Understanding what ingredients in this mix are essential, and   26 
what simply are coincidental, is a topic of ongoing research on which, hopefully, researchers will 
have more to say in the near future. For now, let us turn to the role the international financial 
institutions can play. 
3.3. What can IFIs do? 
Clearly, the international financial institutions can provide the technical support that will 
help countries adopt good policies and improve their narrow institutions (such as their fiscal 
framework or their inflation targeting framework). They can also provide the bilateral and 
multilateral economic surveillance that can alert countries to possible sources of shocks. The 
International Monetary Fund does all this. The million dollar question, of course, is should IFIs 
lend in such situations. 
3.3.1. “Liquidity” Loans 
A dollar shortage seems precisely the kind of temporary need that certain IFIs were set up 
to meet. By creating a common reserve pool of dollars, the IFIs can substitute for costly reserve 
hoarding by countries.  
The most persuasive case for lending is when the IFI alleviates what is essentially a 
market-driven short squeeze on the country. It tides the country over its temporary exchange 
shortage, preventing more destructive domestic sector real adjustment, and gets repaid once the 
reasons for the temporary need vanish (e.g., exports recover). 
The difficulty, of course, even with this simple scenario is that the ultimate cause for a 
dollar shortage has to be that the country loses access to international markets. Thus the IFI has to 
make the judgment call of whether the loss of access is because of irrational/ rational 
uncoordinated behavior by market participants, or whether it stems from genuine fears. If the 
former, most observers would argue that the IFI should act as a lender of last resort. The only 
remaining concern would be whether this role creates bad incentives for market participants, for 
the government, and for banks – the issue of moral hazard – which I will come to in a moment.   27 
If however the adverse shock precipitating the dollar shortage reflects a genuine 
institutional infirmity in the country – for instance that the government has no fiscal discipline, 
has reached borrowing limits, and thus is shut off from international capital markets – matters 
become more difficult. It may well be that the country could undertake reforms that would help it 
regain access. In this case the country is illiquid but solvent contingent on undertaking reforms. 
But solvency will not be restored until the markets gain confidence that the reforms are 
irreversible. This implies that the lending may well not be temporary.  
Given that the alternative is a banking system crisis coupled with a need to restructure 
public debt, both of which will set back the country’s economy considerably, it may well make 
sense to lend even when reforms are highly probable but not fully assured. The IFI bears some 
risk here that it will not be repaid, but it does so in the larger interest of the member country 
facing distress (and it should impose conditionality as well as charge an adequate premium for the 
risk).  
The problem critics have is with the assumption that the IFI has a better ability to gauge 
willingness to reform than market participants. Two arguments have been put forward to justify 
this. First, the IFI may have better information about the country. This may have been true in the 
past, but given the development of financial markets, I see little reason to believe it to be true 
today. Second, the IFI may have a better sense of its own ability (and willingness) to coax the 
reform process forward, and may in fact have to show some success (or put its money at stake) 
before the market is persuaded.  The IFI may also be able put in place incentives for the country 
to reform. I find the second argument more persuasive but one should not rule out the possibility 
that the IFI has an incentive to find a role for itself where none exists. 
A final situation where IFI lending may be warranted is when the country’s public debt is 
too high given its underlying fundamentals, so it cannot borrow, but it also faces an immediate 
dollar shortage as a result, which affects its banking system. Rather than stand back and watch the 
banking system implode, the IFI may want to offer a bridge loan targeted at the banking system,   28 
to be repaid when the country regains market access after restructuring its external public debt. 
This is again a form of liquidity lending but compounded by the problem that the public debt 
problem renders the loan long term.  
All this, however, raises two questions. First, does IFI intervention distort incentives 
among participants? Second, are there better ways to provide assurance of liquidity support to 
member countries? 
3.3.2. Incentive Distortion and Tough Love 
At least three types of incentive distortions are possible: (i) An unwillingness on the part 
of countries to take adequate precautions or to avoid excessively risky situations (ii) an 
unwillingness on the part of investors to take all risks into account, knowing they will be “bailed 
out” (iii) an unwillingness on the part of domestic corporations and banks to insure themselves 
adequately. 
Reams and reams have been written on the issue of moral hazard and I have little to add. 
Some argue that country moral hazard is not an issue because finance ministers and central bank 
governors lose their jobs in a financial crisis. Others argue that investor moral hazard is not a 
problem because investors lose their shirts in a crisis. These arguments are reasonable but miss 
the point. No finance minister will take an action that he thinks will create a crisis for sure. But at 
the margin, concerned about budget deficits, he may prefer to borrow cheaply in dollars than 
borrow more expensively and for a longer term in domestic currency. He will be more likely to 
do so if he knows the IFI will help if things go wrong. At the margin, interventions do distort 
incentives to take risk.  
The question is how much. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence does not offer a 
reasonable indication of magnitudes (see Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2004) for an excellent 
exposition of the issues). My reading of the current consensus is that country and investor moral 
hazard is small in most situations but in a few it could be really big. We need more research 
identifying circumstances where moral hazard is really a problem.   29 
What seems clearer is that domestic corporations and banks may have too little incentive 
to prepare themselves for possible shocks, knowing that there are ways they can force the system 
to share it with them. But this then is a case for better domestic regulation and supervision rather 
than limiting IFI intervention. 
In sum, then, the moral hazard rationale against IFI intervention may well exist in some 
cases but we need to be able to identify those cases better. If these cases are indeed few in 
number, as a reasonable judgment would suggest, then it may well make sense to accept the risks 
of inducing moral hazard through intervention while trying harder to identify when it is a mistake. 
If, however, the reasons for dollarization lie primarily in poor institutions rather than in 
gaming – a collective action problem than an incentive problem -- the greater concern, should not 
be about distorting individual incentives but about altering collective actions. Sometimes external 
discipline forces a country to reform in ways and at a speed that the domestic constellation of 
political forces will simply not allow if left to its own devices. Would it be better for a country 
that repeatedly falls back on IFI support to instead experience “tough love” – a period of sharp 
pain that forces domestic forces to compromise and effect much needed reform? 
This is a difficult question, in part because we simply do not understand the political 
economy of deep institutional reform or of crisis well. Clearly, if there was an assurance that the 
pain would be short and borne by those best able to absorb it, that the country would undertake 
genuine reforms, and that the future would be much brighter, this is certainly an argument worth 
considering. But what if the pain is prolonged, the economy degenerates into warring factions, 
and much of the pain is borne by weaker sections of society? Again, further research is needed 
here. What seems unquestionable is that if this route is chosen, there is a need to apply steady 
external pressure long before a crisis, even conditioning the extent of crisis assistance on 
compliance so that there are no surprises.    
3.3.3. A better way to intervene?   30 
The IMF typically lends only when the member country is experiencing conditions of 
distress. Since intervention, let alone adequate assistance,  is not assured, and the political 
considerations of large shareholders as well as the economic situation of the member country can 
affect these decisions, countries face uncertainty – which reduces the effectiveness of intervention 
in warding off the crisis. Moreover, countries fear that they will be forced to accept unwarranted 
conditionality even if assistance is forthcoming, because they really have no alternatives in a 
moment of crisis. These are understandable concerns: countries with a strong policy regime seem 
to want insurance, not uncertain loans, laden with further uncertainty about conditions.  
The difficulty is in making this distinction. IFIs have been in the business of lending, so 
they want some assurance that the funds that will be drawn down will be returned. On the other 
hand, genuine insurance involves a distinct possibility of loss by the insurer under some 
circumstances. In return, the country pays a premium up front. Of course, the right contract would 
limit the pure transfers from the insurer to the country to only those few circumstances where it is 
welfare improving, while minimizing transfers in all other circumstances. Such a contract would 
also result in a low actuarially fair up front premium. 
Ideally, therefore, it would seem IFI support should be there for a country that 
experiences adverse shocks beyond its own control and where external funds can make a genuine 
difference, while it should be withdrawn if the country deliberately alters its own circumstance 
for the worse or if external funds will not help. An unconditional guarantee of assistance cannot 
distinguish between these situations. Unfortunately, it is equally infeasible to write a reasonable 
contingent contract, in part because of the difficulty of specifying conditions up front – for 
example, does the assassination of a presidential candidate constitute circumstances beyond the 
country’s control? 
Among the possible set of second best contracts are (i) pre-qualification (a country has a 
claim on the IFIs if it follows good policies – but who decides if the policies are good) (ii) 
arbitration panel (an independent panel decides if the country’s call for assistance meets the   31 
criteria laid out for insurance – but what ensures the panel is sufficiently well informed or beyond 
influence), and (iii) mutual insurance (a country builds its claim by setting aside a portion of its 
reserves into a common pool – it has a claim on that pool only if it has been meeting its quota in 
the past and this serves as an objective measure of its past good behavior). All these approaches 
are worth exploring further. 
Conclusion 
I examine liquidity or dollar shortages in dollarized economies in this paper and explore 
how they precipitate and exacerbate crisis. Unfortunately, the easy solution – ban liability 
dollarization – does not seem appropriate. Liability dollarization is a response to institutional 
infirmities. It will not diminish unless those infirmities are fixed. In the meantime, we have to, as 
Guillermo Calvo says, learn to “live with dollarization”. 
 In particular, this means stepped up regulation and supervision up front to ensure that 
dollarization does not become excessive. It also implies the government has the responsibility to 
maintain a reasonable fiscal position so it does not crowd out liquidity, and to maintain adequate 
reserves. It means developing tools for crisis resolution that recognize the nature of the problem – 
a dollar shortage driven banking crisis has to be dealt with in a different way from a banking 
crisis driven by bad loans. IFIs can play a role in all this, but the precise way to circumscribe that 
role has to be worked out. 
Finally, we have to pay more attention to deep-rooted institutional reform. Giving central 
banks more independence and adopting inflation targeting frameworks are good steps, but if not 
accompanied by serious fiscal reform are unlikely to persuade the public to forego dollarization.
9 
It may not be surprising that the level of dollarization has increased over the 1990s despite a fall 
in inflation, perhaps because monetary reforms still lack credibility. Fiscal reform itself may be 
                                                 
9 I agree in many ways with the analysis in Goldstein and Turner (2003), who also focus on institutional 
reform as a way of dealing with dollarization. However, I think it will be more difficult than they seem to 
suggest.   32 
difficult unless political reform creates better basic institutions for allocating burden sharing in 
the economy.  This suggests much work needs to be done.   33 
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Table 1. Institutions, Growth and Inflation in a panel of 165 countries, 1965-2002           
                   
1a. Summary Statistics                    
                   
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  CV       
Inflation Tax  4902  0.098  0.120  -0.323  0.846  1.226       
St. Dev. of  Inf.tax  4859  0.042  0.044  0.000  0.365  1.050       
Inflation   4902  14.871  34.683  -24.430  547.534  2.332       
St. Dev. of  Inflation  4859  8.289  19.453  0.018  206.265  2.347       
Real GDP growth  6428  3.521  5.896  -84.380  59.860  1.675       
                   
Government Efficiency  165  0.062  0.907  -1.827  2.370  14.612       
Rule of Law  165  0.075  0.939  -1.830  2.210  12.493       
Quality of Regulation  165  0.110  0.809  -2.593  1.957  7.372       
Control of Corruption  165  0.057  0.946  -1.610  2.390  16.559       
                   
                   
1b. Pairwise Correlation Coefficients                 
(a star indicates significance at 5% or less)               
                   
   Inf.Tax  Std(Inf.Tax)  Inflation  Std(Inflat.)  GDP growth  Gov.Eff.  Rule Law  Qual. Reg. 
Con. 
Corrp. 
Inflation Tax  1                 
St. Dev. of  Inf.tax  0.4528*  1               
Inflation   0.8763*  0.3863*  1             
St. Dev. of  Inflation  0.5467*  0.8021*  0.5947*  1           
Real GDP growth  -0.2360*  -0.0876*  -0.2327*  -0.1150*  1         
Government Efficiency  -0.2052*  -0.3235*  -0.1563*  -0.1931*  0.0485*  1       
Rule of Law  -0.2270*  -0.3500*  -0.1727*  -0.2151*  0.0377*  0.9401*  1     
Quality of Regulation  -0.1603*  -0.2862*  -0.1325*  -0.1691*  0.0415*  0.8662*  0.8478*  1   
Control of Corruption  -0.2103*  -0.3382*  -0.1585*  -0.2044*  0.0319*  0.9485*  0.9463*  0.8002*  1 
                   
                   
Notes: Inflation tax is p/(1+p), with p the annual CPI inflation.              
The standard deviation of inflation and of the inflation tax for year t is calculated over the 5 year period from t-4 to t.       
Growth is measured as the annual growth rate of real GDP.              
The indicators of the institutional environment are measured by their respective averages over the years 1996, 1998 and 2000.      
Sources: Inflation and GDP figures are from the IMF' s World Economic Outlook 2004 database.         
Institutional indicators are from Kaufmann, Kraay and Matruzzi' s 2003 Governance Matters III database.       
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Table 2. Determinants of Inflation Tax in a panel of 165 countries, 1965-2002               
                             
Dependent Variable: Inflation Tax                           
                             
   RE/GLS     RE/GLS     FE     FE/IV     FE/IV     FE/IV     FE/IV2   
         
Fixed 
Effects   
Instrument 
for 
Growth   
Small 
Country   
Large 




Growth   
   1     2     3     4     5     6     7   
                             
Explanatory Variables:                             
Constant  0.1191  *  0.1209  *  0.1114  *  0.1388  *  0.164  *  0.1133  *  0.1351  * 
  (0.0064)    (0.0062)    (0.0015)    (0.0048)    (0.0143)    (0.0055)    (0.0072)   
Real GDP Growth Rate  -0.0041  *  -0.0048  *  -0.0047  *  -0.0224  *  -0.0225  *  -0.0227  *  -0.0185  * 
  (0.00025)    (0.00035)    (0.00035)    (0.002)    (0.0025)    (0.0047)    (0.0055)   
Government Efficiency      -0.0323  *                     
      (0.0067)                       
Growth*Institutions      0.0015  *  0.0014  *  0.019  *  0.0298    0.0189  *  0.0232  * 
         (0.0005)     (0.0005)     (0.0031)     (0.0185)     (0.0056)     (0.0104)   
                             
Number of observations  4895    4895    4895    4753    2133    2620    2916   
                   
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses below the estimated coefficients.                    
One star indicates significance at 5% or less (most being significant at <1%); two stars indicate significance at 10% or less.       
Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates of random effects GLS regressions; columns 3 to 7 those of fixed effects.           
In columns 4, 5 and 6 we instrument the growth rate and the interaction of growth with institutions, by the "external" growth rate       
and its interaction with institutions. For every country i, and every year, the "external" growth rate is calculated as the average       
of every other country' s j ￿i growth rate weighted by the ratio of log GDP to the square of the distance between country j and country i.    
In column 7, we instrument the growth rate, institutions and the interaction of growth and institutions, by the "external" growth rate,      
the log of population density in 1500 (see Acemoglou, Johnson and Robinson(2002)), and the interaction of "external" growth        
with the log of population density.                             
In column 5 we report estimates for the subsample of countries for which real gdp in US$ in 1999 is below the sample median (small countries),    
while in column 6 we report estimates for the subsample of large countries, those with real gdp in 1999 above the sample median.       
                             
Sources: Inflation tax and GDP growth series based on annual CPI and real GDP series from IMF' s World Economic Outlook 2004 database.   
Government Efficiency indicator: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) Governance Indicators Database.           
Log of population density in 1500: Acemogulu, Johnson and Robinson (2002)                   
 





Table 3. Growth, Inflation and Dollarization                 
                   
3a. Summary Statistics                   
                   
  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max  CV       
                   
Foreign Currency Deposits                         
as % of Total Deposits  91  28.013  23.523  0.143  91.556  0.840       
Inflation Tax  165  0.106  0.089  -0.017  0.567  0.842       
St. Dev. of Inflation Tax  165  0.048  0.035  0.008  0.171  0.726       
Sensitivity of I.Tax on Growth  165  -0.004  0.009  -0.045  0.017  -2.050       
                   
                   
                   
                   
3b. Pairwise Correlations                   
(a star indicates signficance at 5% or less)                 
                   
  FCD/TD  Sensitivity  Inf. tax  SD(Inf.tax)           
Foreign Currency Deposits                       
as % of Total Deposits  1                 
Sensitivity of I.Tax on Growth  -0.3718*  1               
Inflation Tax  0.5581*  -0.4819*  1             
St. Dev. of Inflation Tax  0.6807*  -0.5419*  0.7159*  1           
                   
                   
                   
Notes: Foreign Currency Deposits as a percent of Total Deposits for each country is the average of available observations over 1990 to 2001. 
Inflation tax and its standard deviation for each country is the average for the period 1965 to 2002.          
The sensitivity of inflation tax on growth is the estimated coefficient of growth as a regressor on inflation tax as the dependent variable.   
The regressions were estimated by country for the period 1965 to 2002.             
Sources: For Foreign Currency Deposits/Total Deposits, Nicolo, Honohan and Ize(2003)           
Inflation tax and GDP growth calculations were based on annual CPI and real GDP series in IMF' s World Economic Outlook 2004 database.   
 
 





Table 4. Determinants of Liability Dollarization                       
                           
Dependent variable: 1990-2001 AverageForeign Currency Deposits as % of Total Deposits             
                           
                           
      1     2     3     4     5       
                           
Explanatory Variables:                           
Constant     22.274  *  21.841  *  10.376  *  5.463  **  36.524  *     
    (2.757)    (2.620)    (3.241)    (3.185)    (13.678)       
Sensitivity of Inflation Tax to Growth    -825.455  *  76.571    503.957  **  642.425  *  562.946  **     
    (218.45)    (343.75)    (315.45)    (290.51)    (295.163)       
Square of Sensitivity        42065.290  *  38858.820  *  28381.340  *  25407.530  *     
        (12787.4)    (11323.33)    (10653.91)    (10528.39)       
Inflation Tax            110.697  *  31.704    25.837       
            (21.886)    (27.384)    (29.260)       
Standard Deviation of Inflation Tax                317.068  *  272.092  *     
                (74.958)    (77.690)       
Log of Per Capita GDP                    -3.559  *     
                    (1.634)       
Legal Restrictions on Dollarization                    -3.108  **     
                              (1.695)        
Number of Observations    91    91    91    91    83       
                           
Notes: Estimates based on a cross section of 91 countries except for column 5, where availability of legal restrictions limits the sample to 83.        
The standard deviations are in parentheses under the estimated coefficients. One star indicates significance at 5% or less, two stars at 10% or less.       
The sensitivity of inflation tax to growth is for each country the estimated coefficient of the growth rate of real gdp as regressor          
on the inflation tax as dependent variable; the regressions for the estimation of sensitivity have been estimated for each country separately for the period 1965 to 2002. 
Square of Sensitivity is the square of the above variable.                       
Inflation tax and its standard deviation are measured here by their averages over 1965-2002.                
The measure of legal restrictions on dollarization (0-5, 0 meaning no legal impediments) is based on IMF' s Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions for 2001.   
                           
Sources: Inflation tax, sensitivity of inflation tax to growth, standard deviation of inflation tax: calculations based on CPI and real GDP       
series in IMF' s World Economic Outlook, 2004 database. Log of per capita GDP, World Bank World DeveIopment Indicators, 2004.       
Foreign currency deposits as % of total deposits, and index of legal restrictions on dollarization: Nicolo, Honohan and Ize(2003).           4 
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Figure 1. Real Growth and Inflation Tax when Institutional Quality is Below and Above its Median 
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Note: Real growth, on the horizontal axis, is measured for each country as the average over 1980 to 1995 of the annual growth rate of 
real GDP. Inflation tax, (p/(1+p)), with p the annual CPI inflation, on the vertical axis, is each country' s average inflation tax over 
1980 to 1995.  In the left (right) panel I group those of the 165 countries in the sample for which government effectiveness (average 
value for 1996,1998 and 2000 as in Kaufmann et all (2003)) is below (above) the sample median. 
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Note: The sensitivity of inflation tax to growth is the estimated coefficient of the real gdp growth rate as regressor on inflation tax as dependent variable; regressions by 
country were based on 1965-2002 samples. Liability Dollarization is measured as the ratio of foreign currency deposits to total deposits in percent; for each country we take 
the average for the period 1990-2001.  